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Introduction 
Priority setting in health care is now at the centre of policy and political attention in many parts of 
the world. More countries move towards attaining universal health care, but many struggle to 
ensure the sustainability of their health systems under competing demands from patients, a steady 
increase in medical advances and limited health care budgets. Where trade- offs are inevitable, a 
process that uses evidence to set priorities is essential. The most visible expression of this central 
role is to be found in the establishment of health technology assessment (HTA) agencies with the 
responsibility for determining what counts as value for money in health care and what priority 
should be given to particular interventions. Although the oldest of such bodies, the Australian 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Assessment Committee (PBAC) was founded in 1954, many countries have 
by now established similar bodies, including the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) in the United Kingdom (UK) set up in 1999, the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health 
Care (IQWiG) in Germany set up in 2004, the National Evidence-Based Healthcare Collaborating 
Agency (HIRA) in Korea, the Health Intervention and Technology Assessment Program (HITAP) in 
Thailand as well as many others (Stafinski et al., 2011). At the 2014 World Health Assembly in 
Geneva, a resolution was adopted for the incorporation of health intervention and technology 
assessment to support Universal Health Coverage (UHC). 
Priority setting in health care does not simply take place in the setting of health technology 
assessment agencies, however. Cabinets, government departments, health care agencies and local 
authorities all have a role in priority setting through their routine decisions on resource and 
budgetary allocations, decisions on capital spending, price negotiations with manufacturers on 
pharmaceutical products and medical devices as well as investments in the training of medical and 
para-medical staff. Courts play a role in adjudicating the extent to which some of these decisions, 
when contested by plaintiffs, conform to administrative, constitutional or international law. 
Hospitals and insurance agencies make decisions on which services to provide and to whom. And 
individual physicians are inevitably involved in making decisions on health priorities when they make 
treatment decisions with their patients. From boardroom to bedside the determination of priorities 
is implicit in an organized health care system. 
The context of these decisions is one in which governments and insurance funders increasingly are 
seeking value for money in resource allocation. In high income countries the choices involved 
typically revolve around access to expensive therapies, sometimes of marginal advantage but which 
are thought important by particular groups. Approval and finance of such interventions raise 
considerable issues of policy choice, particularly in fixed budget systems where any positive decision 
necessarily involves an opportunity cost, often with direct implications for disadvantaged groups for 
whom the use of political voice may be harder. In middle and low income countries priority setting is 
increasingly seen to be central to securing universal access to reasonably comprehensive care of 
reliable quality (World Health Organization, 2014), but mechanisms for it are less established. 
A popular mechanism for priority setting is health technology assessment (HTA). Here, it is important 
to distinguish between technology assessment as practised by HTA agencies, and the appraisal of 
assessment outcomes. While HTA is defined as a multidisciplinary undertaking that assesses effects, 
benefits, and harms of a health technology across a range of issues, including social, economic and 
ethical issues (see for example WHO, 2016), in practice the remit of HTA agencies is often limited to 
providing expert evaluations of the benefits and costs of health technologies according the pre-
defined decision criteria and health economic methodologies such as cost effectiveness analyses. 
These processes are largely scientific, technocratic and expert-driven. The results of such processes 
need to be given meaning in the policy making arena. It is for this reason that the process of HTA 
assessment and appraisal are distinct from one another: “Assessment is the science that underlies 
HTA (i.e., the HTA study). Appraisal is the process by which the science is considered at the policy-
making level” (Oliver et al., 2004: 4). This distinction reflects the fact that priority setting decisions 
give rise to contentious distributional conflicts that need to be resolved in the public space that 
includes avenues for deliberation (Landwehr, 2009). 
Priorities can be set in different ways. The most frequently observed and frequently contested 
examples are concerned with decisions about which medicines or interventions to cover for 
provision or reimbursement. Controversies around expensive pharmaceuticals are familiar, but 
similar controversies can occur in relation to such interventions as renal replacement therapies. 
Priority setting also occurs around decisions to disinvest from relatively expensive interventions in 
order to release resources for most cost-effective uses, decisions that, for example, may pitch the 
priority to be given to urban hospitals against the priority to be given to rural public health. Priorities 
are also set, and in low and middle income countries are most commonly set, by failures to include 
certain social groups in the financial risk protection that universal health care allows. 
Even in countries in which governments enjoy a high level of political legitimacy, priority decisions in 
health prompt challenges. Health policy makers or managers cannot assume that they can derive 
legitimacy for their decisions from the general legitimacy of the political system. Even when the 
choices meet formal conditions of due process, they can encounter public resistance. In high income 
countries, such resistance takes the form of campaigners, patient groups and industry contesting the 
decisions on cost effectiveness or on decisions to deny coverage or reimbursement of particular 
interventions. In low and middle income countries it may take the form of citizens protesting against 
the denial of basic services from the government. Where general government legitimacy is low, the 
stock of political capital that health policy makers can borrow from it in making controversial 
decisions may well be very low. 
In this context, policy makers are exploring the potential for direct public participation to enhance 
legitimacy in the identification of priorities. New forms of public participation, for example the use of 
mini-publics like citizens’ juries or deliberative polls, are being developed alongside the 
representation of members of the public in routine decision-making processes. However, alongside 
this top-down interest in participation, priority setting has also stimulated bottom-up forms of 
participation as patient groups, rights activists and others mobilize around the promise of universal 
health care. 
The papers gathered together in this special issue of the Journal of Health Organization and 
Management explore the character, modes and implications of public participation in health care 
priority setting, examining empirically, analytically and normatively the contribution that public 
participation makes to priority setting and health care equity. These papers derive from a workshop 
held at the Brocher Foundation in Geneva in November 2015, which brought together scholars and 
policy makers from twelve different countries to share their experiences and understanding. This 
Introduction presents an overview of the issues that public participation in priority setting raises. 
Defining Public Participation in Priority Setting 
The term ‘public participation’ covers a variety of activities and practices, and no one definition is 
likely to secure universal assent. Our approach has been to follow the lead of Parry, Day and Moyser 
(1992: 16) in their path-breaking study of political participation in Britain and to define participation 
in health policy as a form of political participation, where political participation is defined as ‘taking 
part in the processes of formulation, passage and implementation of public policies’. On this 
definition, public participation in priority setting involves individuals or groups taking part in 
processes of policy making that shape the determination of priorities in health care and the 
conditions of access of different groups in society. Political participation is thus collectively-
orientated and aimed at securing a decision on public policy or legal rules. 
Closely related to the conceptualization of political participation is our understanding of what 
constitutes the ‘political’, which we derive from Lasswell’s definition of politics as involving decisions 
about who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1936). Since priority setting and rationing in health 
care give rise to political conflicts over distributive consequences of decisions (e.g. Landwehr, 2009), 
they can be usefully thought of as decisions about who gets what, when and how. Using Lasswell’s 
definition of politics in this way also underlines one of the normative rationales for public 
participation, namely that those affected by distributive decisions should be included in decision-
making processes whose outcomes affect them. 
The definition of ‘public’ lacks consensus (Abelson et al., 2007; Mitton et al., 2009). Does it refer to 
the general public, to patients, potential patients regarded as consumers or patient groups and 
associated activists? How do we treat the fact that public participation typically means not 
participation by the public as a whole but by selected persons, taken to be representative of the 
whole? These questions are more than just conceptual puzzles for policy analysts; they are also 
practical questions of public administration when designing or reforming participatory practices. For 
example, Australia’s PBAC includes a ‘consumer’ representative while the Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency (PHARMAC) in New Zealand has a consumer advisory panel, made up of 
representatives or advocates of consumers. Patient groups play an important role in Thailand’s 
HITAP. The German Federal Joint Committee, which makes decisions based on the HTA assessment 
of IQWiG, allows for patients to take part in discussions and submit petitions (G-BA, 2016). The 
patient representatives take part in deliberations and propose resolutions, but they do not have 
voting rights (Kieslich, 2015: 106). Similarly, as part of the Thai process for setting priorities for 
inclusion in the basic package of universal health coverage, representatives of patient groups can 
propose items for consideration. Public participation can therefore take a wide variety of forms, with 
different understanding of ‘the public’ affecting how decision-making is structured. 
Public participation in the formal sense also includes institutionalized forms of consultation with the 
public, for example in cases where draft decisions or determination are put out to stakeholders for 
comment. Public participation in the making of policy also includes the use of mini-publics, in which 
selected members of the public come together for the purposes of deliberation in forums 
established by policy makers, to help shape policy and define choices. For example, NICE’s Citizen 
Council represents a form of public participation in our sense. In all of these forms of public 
involvement, participation is institutionalized in some way, so that members of the public play a 
relatively well defined role, working through established procedures, and typically responding to 
policy agendas and issues that have been set by the administrative or political authorities. 
Following Parry, Moyser and Day (1992: 18), we also include in public participation activities that 
they describe as ‘unconventional’, that is to say actions that are outside the confines of conventional 
politics and therefore of the formal policy process. Such activities include demonstrations, political 
strikes, boycotts, acts of interference with traffic and even instances of physical violence or riot. 
However, in some health care systems, as the analysis in a later paper shows (Slutsky et al., 2016), 
these types of activity are far from unconventional; in fact they represent a routine form of public 
participation in priority setting. They include, for example, street protests and demonstrations that 
aim to challenge the legitimacy of decisions about access to care or the availability of medicines. We 
label such participation ‘contestatory’, rather than ‘unconventional’ as in Parry, Moyser and Day, 
because the use of such protests is sometimes routine. 
From this point of view, our definition of public participation is meant to be inclusive, covering both 
its formal, routine and institutionalized forms, on the one hand, and its contestatory forms on the 
other. However, it is exclusive in that it rules out various forms of involvement that are often 
considered important from the point of view of those interested in participatory health care. Of 
these, the most important is the involvement of patients in choices about their own personal care, a 
form of participation that is typically particular to the person concerned carrying no implications for 
public policy. It is restricted to what Mitton et al. (2009: 221) call the macro and meso levels of 
decision-making rather than the clinical level. Thus, when individual patients negotiate with their 
physician about the choice between surgery or watchful waiting, or a pregnant woman determines 
the choice between home or hospital delivery, these are forms of participatory involvement 
excluded from our discussion. Such exclusion is not intended to suggest that such practices are 
unimportant. Indeed, one of the principal ways in which health services may be transformed is 
through the cumulative effect of a large number of individual decisions made by patients. However, 
the decisions remain individual ones taken from a personal perspective (Dolan et al., 2003), and so 
are not directed towards the collective determination of public priorities. 
It might be argued that this distinction between individual and collective is artificial in those cases of 
priority setting where public education (both government or non-government sanctioned) can shift 
personal choices from one form of treatment to another. Moreover, the use of administrative and 
legal challenges by individuals can have widespread policy implications. For example, in 1997 Mr 
Soobramoney, who had kidney failure and other co- morbidities, appealed to the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa for the right to a kidney transplant, even though his medical condition was 
such that he was not eligible under the transplant guidelines of the treating hospital. His appeal was 
based on the grounds that failure to secure the transplant would breach his right, under Section 
27(3) of the South African Constitution, that ‘no one may be refused emergency medical treatment’ 
and Section 11 that stipulates that ‘everyone has the right to life’. In the particular case, the court 
decided that it should not interfere with the existing resource allocation policy of the hospital, ruling 
that Soobramoney’s case was not an emergency (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1997). 
However, had it decided to the contrary, there is no doubt that the individual case would have had 
widespread implications for health care resource allocation in South Africa, potentially requiring 
many other forms of medical care to be provided. As this example shows, even if an individual 
appellant is not aiming at a general change in law or policy, there can be cases where court decisions 
in an individual’s case can have general ramifications. 
Between individual and collective action there is clearly a continuum of activities and we accept that 
there is a fine line to be drawn as to when an individual legal challenge is to count as political 
participation. Sometimes an individual administrative or legal challenge simply affects the individuals 
involved, as is the case with individual funding requests in the United Kingdom’s National Health 
Service or New Zealand’s PHARMAC, where physicians on behalf of their patients request the 
funding of therapies that are not normally covered by the funders. Such types of challenge do not 
figure in our analysis, because they are not challenges to the policy but to the way that the policy 
operates in the individual case. Other legal challenges may have policy relevance, as in the 
Soobramoney case, even if that is not the intention of the appellant. And yet others may be 
individually related but are supported by more general political mobilization. If we were to exclude 
all forms of legal challenge, particularly legal challenge under constitutional provisions, entirely from 
the scope of public participation, we should miss an important element of the dynamics of 
mobilization in a number of countries. Conversely, to exclude the cases of action for purely 
individual reasons keeps the focus on the collective dimension of public participation. 
A second type of participation excluded from our analysis is that involving survey responses and 
similar attempts to ascertain preferences. Such surveys include patient experience surveys, where 
the views of those who have used a service are elicited, but also include experimental results and 
discrete choice experiments. Such experiments “typically involve the presentation of a series of 
choices in which respondents are asked to choose one of two or more alternative scenarios, each 
representing a unique combination of specified attributes and levels of the treatment or service, 
under consideration” (Whitty et al., 2014: 59). An important aspiration of these experiments is to 
provide a sense of the relative priority to be given to alternatives. Our exclusion of these methods of 
public participation from our analysis is not because they are unimportant, or because they should 
be classified as research rather than patient involvement. They are part of the information that flows 
through a health care system and in that sense are an important component of decision-making on 
priorities. However, their policy dynamic is different from the forms of participation with which we 
are concerned, since they are typically the product of administrative processes. In this respect, they 
fall into a different category from patient and public representatives occupying seats on priority 
setting bodies or mobilizing in order to secure a change in policy. A similar point can be made about 
information collected through complaints mechanisms. These may be an important resource for 
policy makers (although typically they are not given sufficient attention), but they are not in 
themselves a means by which patients and the public participate in policy making. Similar points can 
also be made about the use of focus groups, which are often used to assess public reaction to issues, 
but are not themselves integrated into the public deliberative system. 
An important form of public participation that straddles the divide between public deliberative 
system and individual survey response is the use of mini-publics (e.g. Goodin and Dryzek, 2006; 
Grönlund et al., 2014; Niemeyer, 2014; Ryan and Smith, 2014; Niemeyer, 2011). A mini-public is a 
group of lay persons selected so as to be descriptively ‘representative’ in some sense of a wider 
public and asked to deliberate about a policy issue and provide an opinion. They take different forms 
including citizens’ juries, citizen panels, consumer forums or deliberative polls. Sometimes these 
approaches aim at consensus, as with citizens’ juries, and sometimes they prompt individual 
responses to be aggregated, as with deliberative polls. Mini-publics are like surveys in that their 
function is typically to provide policy makers with information about public preferences and 
attitudes. However, they are unlike conventional surveys because they ask participants to deliberate 
about a general policy question, often from the point of view of a citizen rather than a patient, and 
come to a conclusion on that question. In some cases, as with NICE’s Citizens Council, they are 
closely integrated into the decision-making system. In other cases, they may be ad hoc one-off 
events. 
In summary, then, this special issue focuses on public participation that is collective in character, in 
the sense that the participation relates to a social, not personal, decision and is relevant to whole 
groups of people and not single individuals. It can take various forms both formal and 
institutionalized on the one hand, as with public representatives on decision- making bodies, and 
informal and contestatory on the other, as with organized demonstrations and protests. It also 
includes legal challenges, the significance of which go beyond the individual case. The use of mini-
publics should also be included, both when they are routinely integrated into decision-making and 
when they ad hoc and one-off. In identifying these different forms of public participation, we are not 
supposing that they are mutually exclusive. Indeed, different forms of participation may come into 
play in relation to the same types of decision, as discussed in the next section. 
The Scope of Public Participation 
Public participation in health policy can affect a wide range of issues. Following Lomas (1997), 
however, it is possible to identify three broad types of question that can be addressed through 
public participation: decisions on overall levels of funding; decisions of principle on the type of 
services to be offered or reimbursed, including the principles used in health technology assessments; 
and decisions on the eligibility of different types of patients or groups. (Compare also Mitton et al., 
2009: 223, who also add questions of monitoring and evaluation.) 
Overall Funding. Health care spending is popular with citizens in democracies. However, 
opportunities for public participation on such decisions are typically limited, because they are bound 
up either with the wider public expenditure process in government or with the processes of 
determining contributions among the major social partners in social insurance systems. However, it 
is possible in principle to organize such discussions and one example is the Deliberative Poll on the 
future of the UK’s National Health Service held on the service’s fiftieth anniversary and organized by 
the Center for Deliberative Polling at the University of Texas, Social & Community Planning Research 
(SCPR) and Channel 4 (Park et al. 1998; Parkinson 2006). Channel 4 broadcast four episodes about 
the poll on the weekend of 5–6 July 1998. More generally, however, public participation in such 
matters normally takes place through voting in elections and the competition for support by parties 
standing for office. 
Principles of Service Coverage. The most visible forms of priority setting concern which medicines or 
procedures to provide or reimburse within the scope of public coverage. Which pharmaceuticals 
over and above the WHO Essential Medicines list should be covered? What should be included in 
primary health care benefit packages? How far should renal replacement therapy, heart transplants, 
bariatric surgery or infertility treatment be included? Such decisions cannot be avoided, even if they 
are only made implicitly, with potentially limited transparency, rather than explicitly. Disinvestment 
raises similar problems compounded by the fact that, where there are established services, 
individuals and patient groups will have acquired legitimate expectations in the availability of care. 
Obviously, where public representatives sit in an official capacity on decision-making bodies, there is 
some form of public participation in such choices. However, the number of public members is 
necessarily limited, and each public member can quickly become an “institutionalized” expert. One 
of the ways in which policy makers have sought to extend public participation is through the use of 
mini-publics, which can provide a forum in which the principles of coverage can be debated by an 
informed lay public. 
An illustrative example of public involvement through mini-publics of this sort is the Israeli Health 
Parliament, which was a meeting established by officials from the Ministry of Health, researchers 
from Tel Aviv University and members of the Zippori Center for Community Education (Guttman et 
al., 2008: 180). As part of the exercise there were six meetings held in six regional groups in 
community centres, and participants were asked their views on issues of equity (whether people 
should be allowed to pay to ensure their choice of doctor in publicly funded hospitals and whether 
the requirement of co-payment for medical services and medications provided through the National 
Health Insurance system should be continued) and rationing (how should ‘life-saving’ treatment be 
defined and what priority should be given to rare conditions). 
In some cases, the discussions can become quite technical, for example the NICE Citizens Council 
discussed whether the standard time discount rate should be applied to assess the benefits of 
interventions when those benefits occurred at a relatively distant point in the future (NICE, 2011). 
Technology assessment can also prompt participation in the form of demonstrations protests and 
resort to the media. On more than one occasion there have been protests at the offices of NICE over 
particular decisions that the agency has made. 
Decisions on Eligibility for Services. One of the ways in which services can be provided in relation to 
resources is by the denial of services to particular groups of people. Hospitals and clinics in particular 
localities may be closed or the scope of their services reduced. In relation to health technology 
assessment, questions can arise about the extent to which particular groups should be eligible or 
ineligible for services that are generally available. Thus, for instance, the NICE Citizens Council has 
been asked to examine how far age should be a relevant criterion of assessment (NICE, 2003) or 
whether self-inflicted diseases should be given lower weight in assessments. 
Not all decisions on service provision need concern the availability of resources. Instead they may 
concern how best to use such resources as are available. For example, in the provision of some 
services there is a well-known trade-off between accessibility, which suggests small centres of care 
close to patients, and quality, which suggests concentrating care so that professionals improve their 
skills through dealing with large numbers. This sort of trade-off ought to take into account a number 
of considerations, and one of the ways of making a decision is to involve members of the public, or 
patients, in deliberating on alternative courses of action. Thus, early citizens’ juries, financed by the 
King's Fund, were asked to consider the location of specialist cancer services, where the question of 
access versus quality typically emerges (McIver, 1998). Decisions on services, particularly decisions 
to reduce or close services, are often controversial and so it is not surprising that they provoke 
public participation of the contestatory kind. 
Rationales for Public Participation 
Public participation in all its forms in priority setting is an empirical phenomenon, taking various 
forms in different health care systems. As far as rationales go, the emerging wisdom is that involving 
the public can increase the chances of successful policy implementation, manage public 
expectations, improve public understanding of complex policy problems and result in a more 
empowered citizenry (for example Lomas, 1997; Niemeyer, 2011). In light of existing barriers to PPI 
in priority setting (e.g. Goold et al., 2005) though, ascertaining whether these theoretical 
expectations translate into empirical actuality remains a challenging issue. 
However, public participation also raises issues of social and political values that give rise to its 
underlying rationales. There are a number of strands of democratic theory that suggest that, if 
citizens take an active interest in matters of public service, then both instrumental and intrinsic 
values are served. Properly to evaluate the role of public participation in priority setting, then, 
requires us to examine the range of possible values that such participation may serve. Two sets of 
values that are likely to be particularly relevant to questions of priority setting: legitimacy and 
representation. 
Democratic Legitimacy. Priority setting in health policy is an obviously important part of public 
decision-making, and public decisions require legitimation. One minimal notion of legitimacy is 
purely procedural, based on the principle that decisions are legitimate when they are made in 
accordance with legal and constitutional rules and conventions. For example, principles of good 
governance and due process require administrative decisions to be taken after consultation with 
affected parties. One way of understanding public participation is an extension of the existing 
obligation of governments to consult in order to enable individuals and groups to forward views and 
opinions in accordance with their interests. 
However, since the rise of deliberative democratic theory in the 1970s and 1980s, theorists have 
advanced a more demanding standard than purely procedural legitimacy, summarized in Cohen’s 
(1989: 22) claim that political outcomes are legitimate “if and only if they could be the object of free 
and reasoned agreement among equals”. Studies of innovations in public involvement invoke this 
background of theory (Abelson et al., 2013: 1; Guttman, 2007: 411) as part of the rationale for 
increasing and improving public deliberation through the use of mini-publics. One central principle in 
deliberative theory is to move away from the normal pulling and hauling of competing political 
forces in procedures of policy consultation towards a more collectively-orientated and problem-
orientated basis of decision-making. 
This concern with the deliberative quality of policy decisions is reinforced by observations on the 
weakness of conventional competitive party politics and modes of interest-group representation to 
accommodate adequately the scale of views, needs and equality issues to which challenging trade-
offs in health policy give rise. In a competitive party system there is an incentive for those 
campaigning to make incompatible promises, for example offering lower taxes or contributions and 
improved services. In consequence, citizens are rarely confronted by the trade-offs that are required 
by policy choice. “Public deliberation rests on the democratic principle that important societal 
decisions–particularly issues involving competing values and complex trade-offs–are best made by 
policymakers in partnership with an informed public” (American Institutes for Research, 2016). 
New methods of public participation through mini-publics are sometimes seen as rectifying the 
imbalance of financial or human resources between different societal groups. For example, if a 
proposal is made to exclude an intervention from collective health coverage, then industry and 
producer groups are likely to be in a better position to make representations in a consultation than 
individuals. By contrast, if an effort is made to consult citizens through the use of mini-publics, then 
a more general perspective in terms of social values may be garnered. 
However, the literature on deliberative democratic theory also raises complex questions about the 
extent to which instruments of deliberative democracy such as mini-publics can meet the 
requirements of legitimacy that are set out by deliberative democratic theorists. For example, Lafont 
(2015) explores the tensions between the conditions for high-quality deliberative processes, such as 
the participants being open to change their views and opinions as a result of deliberations, and the 
normative demand that participation processes be inclusive of the citizenry at large. She argues that 
“[…] even the most general necessary conditions for deliberation are best satisfied in small-scale 
face-to-face deliberation” (Lafont, 2015: 46). However, the make-up of such small-scale 
deliberations does not necessarily satisfy conditions of what constitutes legitimate representation as 
the representatives in these forums have neither been elected nor selected through democratic 
processes available to the non- participants who may be affected by the outcomes of deliberative 
processes (Parkinson, 2003). This raises complex questions about whether deliberative processes 
can, or should, be used as instruments to inform public policy making (Lafont, 2015). 
The papers in this special issue underline these complexities. As Hunter et al. (2016) conclude, an 
underlying theme of the papers is the importance and the challenge of establishing legitimacy in 
health prioritization. Here, public participation may be thought of as part of the process of 
legitimation as distinct from contributing to the product of legitimacy. The latter is a matter for 
empirical investigation in order to explore whether theories of legitimacy in health care decision-
making actually yield more acceptable decisions in the eyes of those affected (see Kieslich and 
Littlejohns, 2015), whereas the former is a trend, a goal, a demand and a fact in most health care 
systems, albeit in different forms. The different modes of public participation, be they orientated 
towards consensus or contestation (Weale, 2016), can support the decision-making process by 
illuminating additional perspectives and arguments that can be considered. Regardless of the form 
of public participation, behind the question of legitimacy is the important question of 
representation. 
Better Representation. Conventional democratic politics, though based on the principle of 
representation, is biased against various forms of participation. Elected representatives are rarely 
representative of those whom they represent. If social characteristics (age, class, ethnicity, gender 
and so on) are related to political opinion, then a skew in the characteristics of elected 
representatives and public officials, relative to the population at large, runs the risk of neglecting 
important elements of public opinion. More generally, those who are politically active through 
parties and interest groups, which in the case of health care will include patient group 
representatives, are socially unrepresentative of the population at large. 
It is partly for this reason that mini-publics have become popular in some discussions around public 
participation in health care. Mini-publics can be seen as a way of rectifying the imbalance of 
representation brought about through the selection processes inherent in electoral politics, 
although there are important caveats on whether this amounts to legitimate representation (e.g. 
Lafont, 2015; Parkinson, 2003). These caveats relate to the broader literature on how political 
representation is established and how it incorporates deliberative democratic norms (e.g. 
Mansbridge, 1999; Mansbridge, 2003; Parkinson, 2003; Pitkin, 1967; Phillips, 1995; Dryzek and 
Niemeyer, 2008). A large branch of this literature examines how political representatives relate to 
their constituents (Mansbridge, 2003). Traditional forms of representation are closely aligned with 
principal-agents models, where the agent (the political representative) represents the principal (the 
elector) through either a delegate or a trustee model of representation. Under the trustee model 
agents make decisions as they choose, whereas they follow the principals’ instructions directly under 
the delegate model (Parkinson, 2003). These views of representation have been expanded to include 
more nuanced understandings of representation including, but not limited to, descriptive 
representation (Pitkin, 1967), surrogate representation (Mansbridge, 2003) and discursive 
representation (Dryzek and Niemeyer, 2008). While a detailed discussion of these forms of 
representations is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note the recurring questions in 
relation to representation. Who and what is represented? How are representatives selected and 
what is their role (Parkinson, 2003)? How are issues of power played out in deliberative forums? 
A related consideration is diversity. Random sampling will enhance the diversity of social 
characteristics represented in deliberation on public policy, but it will not necessarily capture the 
views and opinions of small minorities who may not be included in a random sample. In some cases, 
for example, members of minorities have been purposively included in mini- public events in order 
to deal with this problem. Any concern with the politics of difference in priority setting will need to 
find some ways of overcoming the selection effects inherent in the policy process, and mini-publics 
seem to offer one way around this problem if they incorporate forms of descriptive representation, 
that is if individuals share characteristics or experiences with particular members of a societal group 
(Mansbridge, 2003; Pitkin, 1967). 
The question of diversity is also important because the price mechanism, which is one familiar way 
of dealing with diversity, is attenuated in the case of health care. For reasons including information 
asymmetry between physicians and patients the regulation of the market based on price 
mechanisms that follow demand and supply fails in the case of health care and it has to be modified 
or suspended and replaced with a collective alternative (Arrow, 1963). However, in restricting the 
operation of the price mechanism, those providing collectively-based universal health care lose the 
role of prices as a source of information about strength of patients, consumer and citizen 
preferences. If citizens are willing to pay for improvements in health care, they may have no way of 
signalling this fact in a system based upon administratively determined resource allocation. If voice is 
to stand in for exit in health services, then the question of how representative the voices are 
becomes important. 
The question of the representativeness or otherwise of the voices that are heard in the priority 
setting process, and the lack of voices that may be missing, has important implications for the justice 
and fairness of the priorities that are set. An influential account of justice in health care resource 
allocation stresses the place of ‘accountability for reasonableness’ (Daniels, 1994; Daniels and Sabin, 
2008). This approach assumes that disputes about priority setting cannot be resolved consensually, 
but they can be resolved procedurally. Provided decision- makers are willing to be open and 
transparent about their reasoning, offering grounds for their judgement that are public, reasonable 
and revisable, then resource allocation can be regarded as fair by virtue of meeting those procedural 
conditions. However, if political participation is unbalanced in representative terms, then the 
legitimacy of decisions based on procedural norms alone is called into question. 
Conclusion 
Public participation in priority setting is both a fact and a challenge. It is a fact because through 
various formal and contestatory routes it exists and plays a role in the way that decisions are made. 
It is a challenge because we have relatively little empirical evidence as to how it affects the decisions 
made, whether it “improves” decisions against some specified desirable criteria, and few attempts 
to assess the extent to which it conforms to democratic norms. This special issue is an attempt to 
address these issues through comparative cross- country analysis. 
The first paper looks at patterns of public participation, and suggests a dynamic in which token 
formal inclusion leads to more active contestatory action (Slutsky et al., 2016). In the second paper, 
Kieslich et al. (2016) examine this dynamic through the analysis of decision-making on interventions 
for the management of Hepatitis C, which has been a controversial priority setting issue in many 
countries. In a third paper, Weale (2016) focuses on the implications for democratic theory and 
argues that given the role of routinized contestation in some priority setting contexts, particularly in 
Latin America, South Korea and South Africa, we should move away from a focus on Habermas-
inspired ideals of consensus through mini- publics to look at ideas of radical democracy associated 
with Chantal Mouffe. Finally, Hunter et al. (2016) provide an analysis of the findings’ implications for 
PPI in health priority setting and for the future research agenda. 
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